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RECENT CASES

INCOME

TAX

LIABILITY-LIABILITY

OF

WIFE

FOR

INCOME

TAX

PROPERTY-Commissioner
assessed tax liability to Appellant for income taxes due
for the years 1955 through 1959. Mrs. Mitchell claimed, because
she had renounced her community property rights as provided
for by Louisiana law, that she was not liable for the delinquent
taxes; and that property inherited by her since the dissolution
of the community could not be used by the Commissioner to satisfy
the tax debt of the community. The Tax Court of the United
States held the wife liable and she appealed. The United States
Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, reversed holding that the community
itself, not the wife as an individual, was liable for the tax and
therefore property inherited by the wife after dissolution of the
community could not be attached to satisfy the tax debt of the
community. Mitchell v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 430 F.2d 1
(5th Cir. 1970).
Taxpayer was married in 1946 and during the years in question
lived in the state of Louisiana, a community property state. The
Tax Court found as a matter of fact that Mrs. Mitchell did not
know of her husband's finances and relied upon his assurances
that their tax returns were properly paid for the years in question.'
In July, 1960, Mrs. Mitchell and her husband were separated. In
1961, taxes were assessed against the Mitchells, but Mrs. Mitchell
had no knowledge of this assessment. Fourteen days after this
assessment Mrs. Mitchell renounced her community interests in
her marriage pursuant to Louisiana law.2 In October of 1962,
the Mitchells were divorced. In 1964, Mrs. Mitchell inherited property from her mother's estate and shortly thereafter transferred
her interest therein to her sister without consideration.
The Tax Court based its decision upon its belief that Section
2410 of the Louisiana Code only permits the wife to exonerate
herself from the contractual obligations of the marriage and that
DEBT-RENUNCIATION

OF

COMMUNITY

1. Mitchell v. C.I.R., 51 T.C. 641, 642-643 (1969).
2. "Both the wife and her heirs or assigns have the privilege of being able to exonerate themselves from the debts contracted during the marriage, by denouncing the partnership or community of gains." LOUISIANA STAT. ANN. § 2410 (1952).
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since taxes are an obligation imposed by the law, renunciation
had no effect upon her liability from taxes imposed upon the community income.3
In reversing the decision of the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals
focused upon the fact that:
[U]nder Louisiana law the wife has a present, vested
ownership interest in4 one-half of the community property,
including its income.
However, the court went on to say,
[T]he bare characterization of this ownership interest as
vested is not determinative of the issue. Under the law of
Louisiana, the wife does not own the income in a separate
capacity. She owns the income only derivatively through
her one-half ownership interest in the community. It is the
community which owns the income and owes the community
debts.5
From the conclusion that the community owns the income, the
court reasoned that, according to Helvering v. Horst,6 the community, not the wife, owes the tax.
In 1930 the Supreme Court, in a series of cases determined
that a husband and wife in the community property states of
Washington, 7 Arizona,8 Texas, 9 and Louisiana 0 could properly
split their income and file separate returns, each claiming one
half the income of the community for the year. These decisions
were based upon the determination by the Court that the interest
of the wife in the income was vested and as a present property
interest could properly be attributable to her as her income.1
In reaching its decision in the instant case, the Court of Appeals
relied upon Pfaff for the proposition that it is the community
which owns the income (although conceding that the wife has a
vested interest therein) and therefore it is the community which
owes the "debt". It is interesting to note at this point that the
3. Mitehell v. Comm'r., 51 T.C. 641, 646 (1969) ; citing Bender v. Pfaff, 38 F.2d 649
(5th Cir. 1930); aff'd Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
4. Mitchell v. C.I.R., 430 F.2d 1, 4 (1970) ; citing United States Fidelity and Guarantee Co. v. Green, 252 La. 227, 210 So.2d 328 (1968) ; and, Phillips v. Phillips, 169 La. 813,
107 So. 584 (1926).
5. Mitchell v. C.I.R., 430 F.2d 1, 4 (1970) ; citing Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930)
and Bender v. Pfaff, 38 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1930); aff'd Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127
(1930).
6. See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
7. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
8. Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930)
9. Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930).
10. Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127 (1930).
11. This disparity between community property and common law states has subsequently been remedied by 26 U.S.C. § 6013.
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Tax Court relied on Pfaff and its companion case of Poe v. Seaborn12
to reach the opposite conclusion and find that Mrs. Mitchell was
liable for the tax "debt." They concluded:
We find no reason why the constitutional precepts Poe
v. Seaborn, that were applicable in permitting community
income to be split, should not be applicable in requiring
the spouse to report and pay her tax on one-half of the community income. 13
It is submitted that the opinion of the Tax Court is a better
reasoned opinion and more in keeping with the existing system
of income taxing. The Tax Court pointed out in its opinion, that
the tax liabilities involved were not a "debt" as envisioned by
Section 2410 of the Louisiana Code. 14 Also, the Court pointed out
that taxpayer had renounced15 her community property interest after
her tax liability had arisen.
Further, the Court pointed out that a wife in Louisiana is
not at liberty to assume or refuse to assume the tax liability
of the community,16 yet the Appellate Court provides her this
opportunity by making her renunciation of the Community interest
effective to relieve her of tax liabilities already attached. In so
doing, the Court of Appeals cites Messersmith v. Messersmith"
for the proposition that "[A]ll sums expended for income tax
. . . must be held to be debts of the community and to be payable
out of community funds."'" However, upon closer reading, it is
readily apparent that the court in Messersmith states a proposition
different from that cited by the Court in Mitchell. The passage
quoted from Messersmith reads in full,
[A]ll sums expended for income tax prior to the rendition of judgment of separation from bed and board, March
25, 1949, must be held to be debts of the community and to
be payable out community funds.' 9 (Emphasis added)
Consequently, even if it is conceded that taxes are "debts" as
envisioned by Section 2410 of the Louisiana Code and therefore
subject to renunciation, Louisiana law properly construed holds
12. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
13. Mitchell v. Comm'r., 51 T.C. 641, 647 (1969).
14. Id. at 646. Here again the Pfaff decision was relied upon. In the Circuit Court
decision rendered in Pfaff the court stated, "[A] tax is not a debt created by contract.
It is created by law, and a duty exists to pay it." Bender v. Pfaff, 85 F.2d 649, 651
(1930). This decision was later affirmed by the Supreme Court as noted supra, and no
mention was ever made of the tax obligation being a "debt" as envisioned by § 2410 of
the Louisiana Code.
15. Mitchell v. Comm'r., 51 T.C. 641, 648 (1969).
16. Id. citing Smith v. Connelly, 65 F.Supp. 415, 417 (E.D. La. 1946); Saenger v.
Comm'r., 69 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1934) ; Comm'r. v. Hyman, 135 F.2d 49 (5th Cir. 1943).
17. Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956).
18. Id. at 176, as cited in Mitchell v. C.I.R., 430 F.2d 1, 4.
19. Id. at 176.
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only that "sums expended for income tax prior to the rendition
of judgment of separation from bed and board" are "debts" which
may be renounced. These "debts" were attached prior to separation,
but payment was not sought by the Commissioner until after separation. Therefore they do not fit the definition of "debts" laid
down in Messersmith and relied upon by the Court as a construction
of Section 2410 of the Louisiana Code.
The second criticism of the Appellate Court's decision is its
limited reading of Pfaff and subsequent cases. In its opinion the
Tax Court pointed out that while Pfaff and its companion cases
held that income could be split between husband and wife when
reporting income, such income splitting was not mandatory. However, in the case of Paul Cavanaugh" it was held that the wife
was obligated to return one-half of the income of the property.
The Tax Court stated in Cavanaugh:
[Income must be reported by the individual to whom the
statute attributes it. Clearly, therefor, the petitioner's
wife is taxable on one-half of the community income. She
is the owner thereof, although not entitled to present possession....
Consequently, there is no longer the situation whereunder the
wife may at her option return one-half of the
21
income.
22
Citing the Pfaff line of cases and United States v. Malcolm,
the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld the Cavanaugh
decision that income admittedly earned by the husband alone (the
wife was residing in Canada during the taxable period in question)
was taxable to him only to the extent of his one-half interest
28
in the community. The other income was taxable to his wife.

In the Malcolm case the Supreme Court held that the entire
income tax in California is not due from the husband, but rather
it is community income, and that a wife in California is obligatd
to report and pay tax on one half of the community income. 24
It is worthy of note that the Supreme Court cited the Pfaff line
of cases as authority for its decision in Malcolm. The Court of
Appeals in the instant case ignores this mandatory splitting interpretation of Pfaff and says instead that the Pfaff decision merely
permits income splitting if the wife so chooses, but if she chooses
not to claim one-half of the community income as earned by her,
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Paul Cavanaugh, 42 B.T.A. 1037 (1940); auf1d 125 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1942).
Id. at 1043-10444
United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1931).
C.I.R. v. Cavanaugh, 125 F.2d 366 (1942).
United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792, 793 (1931).
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the husband is powerless to compel her to do so. In view of
the one paragraph opinion in Malcolm, the Supreme Court does
not agree.
It is submitted that the decision rendered in this case may
prove to be unworkable and that it results in an inequity to the
husband in a community property state. Perhaps the Louisiana
Code is the source of inequity with its provision for renunciation
by a wife, but none for a husband (although, as discussed above,
Section 2410 of the Code is open to an interpretation other than
the unjust one applied here).
One wonders whether the Court of Appeals would have been
so willing to allow the taxpayer to escape liability if it had been
the husband who sought to renounce his community interest and
thereby have all the income assessed to his wife. In a time when
the law is ever more watchful of women's rights under the guise
of "women's lib," perhaps it should also consider declaring unconstitutional such archaic laws as Section 2410 of the Louisiana Code,
or courts should at least avoid interpretations of laws which will
afford special privileges to women merely because they are women.
After all, equality is a double-edged sword; we must be careful
that women be equal to men, but also careful that they aren't
made, by decisions such as this, more equal than men.
DWIGHT F. KALASH
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I-S(C)

CLASSIFICATION-While not enrolled at a university, plaintiff was
ordered to report for induction. Prior to the date of his scheduled
induction, he voluntarily enrolled at a university, notified his local
draft board of his new student status, and requested to be reclassified from I-A to I-S(c). The local board refused to reopen his
classification stating that the facts presented were not sufficient
to qualify him for a I-S (c) deferment since they did not show
that he was satisfactorily pursuing a full-time course of instruction
on the date of receipt of his induction order. Thereafter, plaintiff
sought an injunction from the United States District Court, to enjoin
the local board from inducting him.
In declining jurisdiction and at the same time deciding the
merits of the case the court held that the failure of the local
board to reopen plaintiff's I-A classification when informed of
his new status was not "blatantly lawless"' because the board
1.

50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460(b) (3) (1967)

states: "No Judicial review shall be made

